## 1NC

## CAP

**The securitization of the 1AC is the bourgeois attempt to push forward the ultimate capitalist agenda to construct threats in order to justify conservatism**

**Neocleous, 8**-Professor of Critique of Political Economy @ Brunel University [Mark, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government, Published 2008]

We are often and rightly told that security is intimately associated with the rise of the modem state. But we also need to note that it is equally intimately bound up with the rise of bourgeois property rights and a liberal order-building, and in later chapters we will see the extent of this intimacy. In this way liberalism's conception of security was intimately connected to its vision of political subjectivitycentred 1 on the self-contained and property-owning individual. The reason liberty is wrapped in the concept of security, then, is because security is simultaneously wrapped in the question of property, giving us a triad of concepts which are usually run so close together that they are almost conflated ('liberty, security, property'), a triad found in Smith, j Blackstone, Paine, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in various other formulations elsewhere.' Thus as liberalism generated a new conception of 'the economy' as its founding political act, a conception which integrated the wealth of nations, the world market and the labour of the population, its notion of liberty necessitated a particular vision of security: the ideological guarantee of the egoism of the independent and self-interested pursuit of property. It is for this  reason Marx calls security [is] 'the supreme concept of bourgeois society'.' Marx spotted that as the concept of bourgeois society, security plays a double role: The progress of social wealth,' says Storch 'begets this useful class of society . . . which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions, which, in a word takes on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life, and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional' (c'est bon, ca) 'dignity of character'. Storch then asks himself what the actual advantage is of this capitalist civilization, with its misery and its degradation of the masses, as compared with barbarism. He can find only one answer: security!  One side of this double role, then, is that security is the ideological justification for 'civilisation' (that is, capitalism) as opposed to 'barbarism' (that is, non-capitalist modes of production); hence Locke's need to move from the 'state of nature' to the state of civil society. The other side is that security is what the bourgeois class demand once it has exploited, demoralised and degraded the bulk of humanity. For all the talk of 'laissez faire', the 'natural' phenomena of labour, wages and profit have to be policed and secured. Thus security entails the concept of police, guaranteeing as well as presupposing that society exists to secure the conservation of a particular kind of subjectivity (known as 'persons') and the rights and property associated with this subjectivity." The non-liberal and non-capitalist may be 'tolerated' - that other classically liberal concept which also functions as a regulatory power - but they will also be heavily policed ... for 'security reasons'? The new form of economic reason to which liberalism gave birth also gave new content to the idea of reason of state and thus a new rationale for state action: the 'free economy'. In other words, if security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society it is equally the supreme concept of liberal ideology.

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**“Free trade” is spread though the imperialism and the threat of force – it is an ideological justification for removing barriers to exploitation**

**Tabb 7** (William, Dep. of Econ @ Queens College, Monthly Review Vol. 58.10 March JF)

What drives capitalism is not some imaginary free market with its consumer sovereign but rather capital’s drive to accumulate. Imperialists seeking to exploit peoples and resources wherever they find vulnerable social formations make their calculation exclusive of the cost to their own nation’s treasury, except to the extent they themselves bear any burden of expenditure. The saturation of domestic markets and the drives to lower cost, find new sources of profit, and employ technological revolutions for accumulation purposes combine to drive capitalism outward. Trade was rarely initiated, as the economists’ model would have it, out of free consent for mutual advantage between core and periphery. In the early stages of imperialism—of plunder and piracy—this was self-evident and overseas expansion required a very different rationale. From a marxist view successful capitalism needs the national state to overcome internal barriers to the creation and smooth operation of its home market and to protect its traders’ and investors’ interests abroad in a world of rival states. So if the drive to expand and to encompass the world market is given in the nature of capitalism as Marx suggested, then imperialism is not an accident but integral to its operation and logic. The drive to compete does not presume, as the mainstream economists would have it, an ideal of perfect competition as the tendential norm and starting point of analysis, but the use of state power on the part of the strongest elements to intervene on behalf of their power to exploit and extort rules favorable to the greatest appropriation of surplus. As innovations in transportation and communication develop so does the capacity to more deeply penetrate other social formations. Those who take imperialism seriously think that the models mainstream economists construct underspecify and misspecify the way trade and growth are connected and incorporate assumptions (such as full employment of all resources in a competitive marketplace) that do not model actual capitalism’s character. As Patrick O’Brien writes “In order to measure the costs and benefits that might have arisen from a disembodied imperialism they have resorted to an analysis based upon an altogether unrealistic counterfactual; namely, an international economic order, operating between 1688 and 1815 under competitive conditions, virtually free from governmental interference with trade and untroubled by warfare.”8 Such counterfactual economic theory that presents “free trade” as the dominant reality even in the colonial era itself has then been used to argue that the burdens of colonies and the imperial military apparatus outweigh their benefits since free trade is more efficient and more beneficial to both parties. Counterfactual history is a difficult, if not in most instances an impossible, business. But it is not without interest that in 1820, according to Angus Maddison’s calculations, Asia generated 59 percent of global GDP (by purchasing power parity measure); in 1950 just 18 percent of world GDP.13 It is difficult to think that foreign intervention and conquest had nothing to do with this huge relative decline. When a post-Maoist government sought an opening to the West on its own terms, these disgraces were a vivid memory. Thus they desired a carefully calibrated economic policy that would allow them to control this process. Developmental states have found industrial policy can be used effectively as in Japan and Korea. The activities of the IMF and the WTO as directed by the countries of the core can be read as acting to prevent the possibility of state-led development, once practiced by the now developed economies. There continues to be a need for active interventionist policies to establish and maintain what has been called “free trade,” and military intervention and the threat of use of overwhelming force remain central tools of the imperialist project. Imperialism is a capacious category and its usage has stretched from control and rivalry over foreign markets to the face of conquest and regime change. The role of corporate and financial interests in removing obstacles to trade and investment is of course hardly absent in the current imperialist adventure in Iraq. An administration deeply entangled in oil and defense contracting has thus lied its way into what is proving a painful quagmire. The application of the Bush Doctrine has pushed to the background the framework which has guided the polices of his father’s administration and the Clinton White House—the expansion of U.S. power through the creation and modification of trade and investment relations on a global terrain. We are reminded by today’s events that imperialism is above all about defending and expanding global control. This involves two tactical avenues: military force and political governance. The two go together although not always in overt ways. Twenty-first-century imperialism is about neoliberal globalization. The regimes for trade, finance, and investment of the global economic governance institutions—the IMF, the WTO, and others—are nonetheless supplemented when imperialism believes it necessary by the old standby of military conquest and horrific violence. Washington’s arrogance of invasion and regime change, of naked imperialist ambition, is in our time a failure—in all but its ability to inflict horrendous cost on its victims. It has given rise to a vibrant antiwar movement and the dissatisfaction of tens of millions of Americans who have recently become more aware of the arrogance of imperialist power.

#### Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life

Simonovic 7 [Ljubodrag, Ph.D. in Philosophy; M.A. in Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”] Gender edited

The final stage of a mortal combat between [hu]mankind and capitalism is in progress. A specificity of capitalism is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it annihilates life by creating a "new world" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which ~~man is~~ [people are] struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of ~~man~~ [people] as a natural being[s]. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. For capitalism a "traditional ~~man~~ [person]" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer~~-man~~ [person]" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism-caused process of mutation of man towards the "highest" form of capitalistic ~~man:~~ a robot~~-man.~~ "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, alienated from man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of loving, thinking, daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing transformation of nature into a surrogate of "nature", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man are direct consequences of capital's effort, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and [hu]mankind has been performed that life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place.

Our alternative is to vote negative to reject the affirmative as a refusal to participate in activities which support capitalism. We must hollow out capitalist structures by refusing to invest our energy in reforms and rescue operations—avoids transition wars

Herod 4-Social Activist since 1968, owns an awesome website, Attended Columbia University and spent a year abroad at the University of Beirut (Lebanon) [James, Getting Free, 2004, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm]

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and *start participating* in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing everything we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There *is* no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must *want something else* and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

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Counterplan text: The United States federal government should lift its trade blockade on the Republic of Cuba.

Rhetoric of “normalization” sidelines the queer identity and reinforces heteronormativity – the counterplan calls for a queering of dominant social rhetoric in the public sphere.

Alexander & Rhodes 12 (Jonathan Alexander – Professor of English @ UC Irvine, Jacqueline Rhodes – Professor of English @ CSU San Bernardino, Enculturation, “Queer Rhetoric and the Pleasures of the Archive”, 1/16/12, http://enculturation.net/queer-rhetoric-and-the-pleasures-of-the-archive)

Warner’s distinction between publics/counterpublics notes how agency in the public sphere relies on being able to articulate and maintain the dominant lifeworld. This move toward maintenance explains the high level of activity around gay marriage issues, for instance; opponents of gay marriage attempt to preserve a particular view of what marriage is and how it should be defined, while proponents argue that gay relationships are often just like straight ones, so they should be labeled and understood as such—not just rhetorically, but in material reality. Indeed, the marriage debate offers a rich example of Warner’s assertion that “all discourse or performance addressed to a public must characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate.” If queers are to have agency within the dominant public sphere, they must address how that sphere characterizes itself to itself. In this case, queer lives become intelligible—one wants to say “legible”—only when they articulate themselves in the rhetoric of the dominant. That is, queers who claim marriage rights narrate their lives through the structures of the dominant public, the dominant lifeworld. Agency for queers, then, sometimes becomes possible in the dominant public sphere only to the extent to which they can position themselves rhetorically as both challenging and maintaining the lifeworld structures and narratives of the dominant culture. In this sense, then, rhetorical agency for many queers refracts a heterosexualized experience; we as queers must articulate ourselves and our desires in ways that coincide with a dominant “straight” culture—or risk being never heard or, worse, misunderstood and vilified, even attacked. Indeed, queer selves often only gain legibility in the larger public sphere to the extent that they mimic, as pale imitations, the heteronormal—we want to get married (check normal), we want to serve in the military (check normal), we want to join the status quo, helping to maintain it in the process. But sometimes, the status quo isn’t enough. Sometimes anger, outrage, fear, and embodied boldness must intervene to break silences, to launch critique, to provoke. Indeed, Warner’s conceptualization of the public sphere as significantly “poetic” strikes us as a very queer understanding. For is it not in the poetic that we encounter the excesses of the rational, the margins of logical understanding, often brought to the center of discourses as persuasive appeal? We call this a queer understanding in the sense of “queer” that follows on the heels of the work of queer theorists and activists, who broadly understand the notion of “queering” as a deep questioning of normative understandings and practices of identity as figured on and through sexual (hetero)norms. As theorists from Michel Foucault to Judith Butler to David Halperin have made clear, our identities and modes of figuring self are dominated by discourses of normative gender and heteronormative sexuality, which discipline how we articulate both the truth of our being and the values in which we invest. The figure of the queer insists on disrupting such normative understandings, creating a space—a poetic space, as Warner might have it—to address and potentially give voice to the excesses of normalization, the excluded others, the residuals of the processes of economizing desire along “straight” and narrow pathways.¶ With this theoretical backdrop in mind, we argue here that queer rhetoric names a constellation of discursive practices that emerge at different times for different groups in order to articulate resistance to regimes of sexualized normalization. Such strategies seek to remedy the impoverishment of our imaginations, of our sexual and gender imaginary, and to re-introduce into public discourse the imagination of bodies that exceed the normalizations of the juridical, political, medical culture that “fixes” things. Our particular exploration of queer rhetorical strategies emphasizes two dimensions. First, we take seriously Warner’s sense of the “poetical” nature of rhetorical play in the public sphere. To that end, we offer a brief genealogy of the emergence of poetical rhetorical practices in the public sphere in the nineteenth century. Second, we show, in a few contemporary examples, how those practices actively queer (hetero)normative understandings of rhetorical practice: ethos, logos, and pathos. Indeed, our intervention in this essay will argue that as they circulate in the public sphere, ethos, logos, and pathos (reflecting as they do Aristotle’s own ethos as it is articulated in histories of Western rhetoric) circulate in the service of heteronormativizing rhetorical strategies. We maintain the necessity of queering such normalization to create productive rhetorical space for alternative views, critical differences, and possible freedoms.

**Heteronormativity results in omnicide. The combination of the universal suspicion of queerness and the genocidal impulse to eradicate it motivates a larger apocalyptic movement to rescue hetero-culture with extinction.**

Sedgwick 8 (Eve, Professor of English at Duke University, *Epistemology of the Closet*, second revised edition, California at Berkeley Press, p. 127-130)

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing—the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide. The deadlock of the past century between minoritizing and universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual definition can only have deepened this fatal bond in the heterosexist imaginaire. In our culture as in Billy Budd, the phobic narrative trajectory toward imagining a time after the homosexual is finally inseparable from that toward imagining a time after the human; in the wake of the homosexual, the wake incessantly produced since first there were homosexuals, every human relation is pulled into its shining representational furrow. Fragments of visions of a time after the homosexual are, of course, currently in dizzying circulation in our culture. One of the many dangerous ways that AIDS discourse seems to ratify and amplify preinscribed homophobic mythologies is in its pseudo-evolutionary presentation of male homosexuality as a stage doomed to extinction (read, a phase the species is going through) on the enormous scale of whole populations. 26 The lineaments of openly genocidal malice behind this fantasy appear only occasionally in the respectable media, though they can be glimpsed even there behind the poker-face mask of our national experiment in laissez-faire medicine. A better, if still deodorized, whiff of that malice comes from the famous pronouncement of Pat Robertson: "AIDS is God's way of weeding his garden." The saccharine luster this dictum gives to its vision of devastation, and the ruthless prurience with which it misattributes its own agency, cover a more fundamental contradiction: that, to rationalize complacent glee at a spectacle of what is imagined as genocide, a proto-Darwinian process of natural selection is being invoked—in the context of a Christian fundamentalism that is not only antievolutionist but recklessly oriented toward universal apocalypse. A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation. This is evidenced in projects for universal testing, and in the needle-sharing implicit in William Buckley's now ineradicable fantasy of tattooing HIV-positive persons. But most immediately and pervasively it is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of gays--which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact. It might be worth making explicit that the use of evolutionary thinking in the current wave of utopian/genocidal fantasy is, whatever else it may be, crazy. Unless one believes, first of all, that same-sex object-choice across history and across cultures is one thing with one cause, and, second, that its one cause is direct transmission through a nonrecessive genetic path--which would be, to put it gently, counter-intuitive--there is no warrant for imagining that gay populations, even of men, in post-AIDS generations will be in the slightest degree diminished. Exactly to the degree that AIDS is a gay disease, it's a tragedy confined to our generation; the long-term demographic depredations of the disease will fall, to the contrary, on groups, many themselves direly endangered, that are reproduced by direct heterosexual transmission. Unlike genocide directed against Jews, Native Americans, Africans, or other groups, then, gay genocide, the once-and-for-all eradication of gay populations, however potent and sustained as a project or fantasy of modern Western culture, is not possible short of the eradication of the whole human species. The impulse of the species toward its own eradication must not either, however, be underestimated. Neither must the profundity with which that omnicidal impulse is entangled with the modern problematic of the homosexual: the double bind of definition between the homosexual, say, as a distinct risk group, and the homosexual as a potential of representation within the universal. 27 As gay community and the solidarity and visibility of gays as a minority population are being consolidated and tempered in the forge of this specularized terror and suffering, how can it fail to be all the more necessary that the avenues of recognition, desire, and thought between minority potentials and universalizing ones be opened and opened and opened?

Interrogating discursive formations of normality is critical to resist dominant power structures – individual use of language matters.

Bevir 99 (Mark Bevir, Professor of PoliSci @ UC Berkeley, “Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency Against Autonomy”, Political Theory, 1/1/99, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5th397ks)

To begin, therefore, let us look at power/knowledge and its role in constructing¶ the subject. Foucault postulates a historical series of regimes of power/knowledge, all¶ of which are incommensurable with one another, and each of which sustains a¶ different type of subjectivity. All knowledge arises out of a power complex: regimes¶ of power define what counts as a meaningful utterance, what topics are to be¶ investigated, how facts are to be produced, and the like. Equally, however, all regimes of power are constituted by discursive formations: regimes of knowledge¶ define who does and who does not have the intellectual authority to decide issues,¶ how information should be gathered about who and by who, and the like. Power and¶ knowledge always imply one another: they interpenetrate within specific regimes that¶ provide the modes of subjection, and also liberation, through which subjects constitute¶ themselves. Foucault argues that ideas such as subjectivity, personality, and the soul¶ are just part of a specific discursive formation produced by the operation of a specific¶ power complex on the body. Here one can see Foucault's Discipline and Punish as an¶ attempt to analyse the way power works on the body through external controls, and his¶ History of Sexuality as an attempt to analyse the way it does so through internal¶ controls. The former work looks at the rise of the modern system of surveillance in¶ prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, and so on.7 Modern power relies on constant¶ supervision and control of individuals in accord with a certain concept of normality.¶ The later work looks at the extension of a confessional technology of the self from a¶ religious domain to social life as a whole.8 Individuals police themselves by¶ examining, confessing, and regulating their own thoughts and behaviour in accord¶ with a certain concept of normality. Even if Foucault sometimes appears to put too¶ much emphasis on the body at the expense of things such as the law, the crux of his¶ position is clear: society, conceived as a specific regime of power/knowledge, defines¶ the subject, conceived in terms of both the norms by which we try to live and the¶ techniques by which we try to ensure we do so. The individual is the arbitrary¶ construct of a social formation. Society gives us the values and practices by which we¶ live.

## Multi Lat

**The only impact in this advantage is Asian wars and their evidence says we need to persuade China and India to join the “existing structure of relations” – shifting the global system to multilateralism does not solve this – and it makes no claim that multilateralism or international institutions are important. The card also makes a claim that China overtaking the U.S. is inevitable – that means there will be a unilateral system even if the U.S. abdicates power. It also says that MAD solves all of these conflicts.**

#### Their advantage is predicated on the idea that changing the perception of US IR will mean other countries will want to follow us. Their tag even says the plan will lead to bandwagoning. This is the ultimate example of orientalism: that the west thinks we can know and understand the other and therefore control their behavior.

#### Examining in-round discourse is key to deconstructing the power structures that words represent. Unchecked discursive resistance becomes the power to subjugate the other.

JAEKEL 13 “Sometimes, It’s Us: Examining the Power in Discourse” by Dr. Katy Jaekel. Commission for Social Justice Educators Blog. March 5, 2013. Dr. Katy Jaekel is a lecturer for the Department of English at Iowa State University. She is currently working on a project that uses Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis to examine ways in which power is (re)produced through discourse. She and her partner, Carrie, have a very cute fluffy dog and three wonderful cats.

While there are many types of linguistic and non-verbal forms of resistance, I have found two primary ways surface in the classroom. The first is what I call blatant resistance where students outright condemn any effort of social justice. We, as educators, often focus on this form because it is the easiest to spot. It is the language students use in class, in their papers, and in their everyday lives that calls people “fags,” “dykes,” (these comments are meant in the pejorative and not signifiers of identity) or the phrase that “homos are going to hell.” Certainly, these comments are troubling. And certainly, these comments should be addressed. Yet, most educators (hopefully) address these forms of resistance. It has been my experience that these comments, at least when issued in the classroom, are addressed to some extent.

The second form of resistance, one that surfaces far more often, is discursive resistance. I argue here that we should be examining the discursive forms of resistance just as much as we do the blatant because they are far more widespread and damaging, in part because these comments go unaddressed. I feel social justice educators should shift more of their focus on these discursive comments and use them as a tool to teach about institutional power.

To begin, I am defining discursive resistance based on the Foucauldian (1982) definition of discursive formation. According to Foucault, discourse has a larger meaning than simply one person saying something. Rather, discursive formation recognizes that the discourse is mediated by the institution where it is uttered; it is mediated by institutional rules, institutional power hierarchies, and institutional control. Thus, when discursive formations are uttered, they are indicative of how that discourse was formed: it is a marker of a certain meaning that was influenced by a certain power structure. In the end, this discursive formation becomes power and serves as a regulating tool. Essentially, then, the discourse, which is mediated by the institution, serves to (re)produce power inequities.

#### Orientalism turns case and means that the epistemological truth claims of the AFF are suspect. Until the AFF can justify the epistemology of their authors they cannot access the solvency of the Aff.

#### The affirmative’s representations of the Other—the simple act of representation -- is a display of power that renders the Other fixed and knowable, thus laying the path for Orientalist conquest.

Said 78 [Edward Said, Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, Orientalism, pg. 308-309]

One can explain such statements by recognizing that a still more implicit and powerful difference posited by the Orientalist as against the Oriental is that the former writes about, whereas the latter is written about. For the latter, passivity is the presumed role; for the former, the power to observe, study, and so forth; as Roland Barthes has said, a myth (and its perpetuators) can invent itself (themselves) ceaselessly. The Oriental is given as fixed, stable, in need of investigation, in need even of knowledge about himself. No dialectic is either desired or allowed. There is a source of information (the Oriental) and a source of knowledge (the Orientalist), in short, a writer and a subject matter otherwise inert. The relationship between the two is radically a matter of power, for which there are numerous images.

#### Orientalism results in the dehumanization of the Other. Said 78

[Edward Said , Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, Orientalism, pg. 108-109]

In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient's cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow citizens." Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient's misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, The Cambridge History of Islam, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social-science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident.

#### Questioning epistemology is a precursor to the evaluation of the affirmative’s truth claims, which is necessary for a truly valuable debate.

Oyewumi 97 [Oyeronke, Associate Professor of Sociology, SUNY Stony Brook, “The Invention of Women Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses,” University of Minnesota Press]

THIS BOOK is about the epistemological shift occasioned by the imposition of Western gender categories on Yoruba discourse. Since there is a clear epistemological foundation to cultural knowledge, the first task of the study is to understand the epistemological basis of both Yoruba and Western cultures. This endeavor is best described as archaeological, in that it is concerned with revealing the most basic but hidden assumptions, making explicit what has been merely implicit, and unearthing the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying research concepts and theories. Only when such assumptions are exposed can they be debated and challenged.

## 2NC

**Capitalism causes incalculable deaths—nothing can outweigh—this is war**

**Herod 7**-Social Activist since 1968, owns an awesome website, Attended Columbia University and spent a year abroad at the University of Beirut (Lebanon) (James, 2007, “Getting Free” Pg. 22-23)

We must never forget that we are at war, however, and that we have been for five hundred years. We are involved in class warfare. This defines our situation historically and sets limits to what we can do. It would be nice to think of peace, for example, but this is out of the question. It is excluded as an option by historical conditions. Peace can be achieved only by destroying capitalism. The casualties from this war, on our side, long ago reached astronomical sums. It is estimated that thirty million people perished during the first century of the capitalist invasion of the Americas, including millions of Africans who were worked to death as slaves. Thousands of peasants died in the great revolts in France and Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the enclosures movement in England and the first wave of industrialization, hundreds of thousands of people died needlessly. African slaves died by the millions (an estimated fifteen million) during the Atlantic crossing. Hundreds of poor people were hanged in London in the early nineteenth century to enforce the new property laws. During the Paris uprising of 1871, thirty thousand communards were slaughtered. Twenty million were lost in Joseph Stalin’s gulag, and millions more perished during the 1930s when the Soviet state expropriated the land and forced the collectivization of agriculture an event historically comparable to the enclosures in England (and thus the Bolsheviks destroyed one of the greatest peasant revolutions of all time). Thousands of militants were murdered by the German police during the near revolution in Germany and Austria in 1919. Thousands of workers and peasants were killed during the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler killed ten million people in concentration camps (including six million Jews in the gas chambers). An estimated two hundred thousand labor leaders, activists, and citizens have been murdered in Guatemala since the coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954. Thousands were lost in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Half a million communists were massacred in Indonesia in 1975. Millions of Vietnamese were killed by French and U.S. capitalists during decades of colonialism and war. And how many were killed during British capital’s subjugation of India, and during capitalist Europe’s colonization of Asia and Africa? A major weapon of capitalists has always been to simply murder those who are threatening their rule. Thousands were killed by the contras and death squads in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thousands were murdered in Chile by Augusto Pinochet during his counterrevolution, after the assassination of Salvador Allende. Speaking of assassinations, there is a long list: Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci (died in prison), Ricardo Flores Magon (died in prison), Che Guevara, Gustav Landauer, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Hampton, George Jackson, the Haymarket anarchists, Amilcar Cabral, Steve Biko, Karl Liebnicht, Nat Turner, and thousands more. Thousands are being murdered every year now in Colombia. Thousands die every year in the workplace in the United States alone. Eighty thousand die needlessly in hospitals annually in the United States due to malpractice and negligence. Fifty thousand die each year in automobile accidents in the United States, deaths directly due to intentional capitalist decisions to scuttle mass transit in favor of an economy based on oil, roads, and cars (and unsafe cars to boot). Thousands have died in mines since capitalism began. Millions of people are dying right now, every year, from famines directly attributable to capitalists and from diseases easily prevented but for capitalists. Nearly all poverty-related deaths are because of capitalists. We cannot begin to estimate the stunted, wasted, and shortened lives caused by capitalists, not to mention the millions who have died fighting their stupid little world wars and equally stupid colonial wars. (This enumeration is very far from complete.) Capitalists (generically speaking) are not merely thieves; they are murderers. Their theft and murder is on a scale never seen before in history a scale so vast it boggles the mind. Capitalists make Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, and Attila the Hun look like boy scouts. This is a terrible enemy we face.

**A-Priori ethical obligation to reject capitalism**

**Zizek & Daly 4**-(Slavoj, PhD in Philosophy @ the University of Ljubljana, Senior Research in Sociology @ the University of Ljubljana, Professor of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis @ the European Graduate School, has been a visiting professor @ University of Chicago, Columbia University, Princeton, University of London, and NYU, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, and Glyn, has been a Professor @ Essex University and Manchester University, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

# 2NC Framework-Long

Debate is a pedagogical activity where the plan obviously never happens—fiat is illusory—that means the role of the judge is to be a critical intellectual deciding between competing political strategies. The roll of the ballot is to assess which team best critically and methodologically destroys capitalism

Giroux 6/19/12 [Henry, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, “Beyond the Politics of the Big Lie: The Education Deficit and the New Authoritarianism” June 6, 2012 <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism>]

While a change in consciousness does not guarantee a change in either one's politics or society, it is a crucial precondition for connecting what it

means to think otherwise to conditions that make it possible to act otherwise. The education deficit must be seen as intertwined with a political deficit, serving to make many oppressed individuals complicit with oppressive ideologies. As the late Cornelius Castoriadis made clear, democracy requires "critical thinkers capable of putting existing institutions into question.... while simultaneously creating the conditions for individual and social autonomy."[(41)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a41) Nothing will change politically or economically until new and emerging social movements take seriously the need to develop a language of radical reform and create new public spheres that support the knowledge, skills and critical thought that are necessary features of a democratic formative culture. Getting beyond the big lie as a precondition for critical thought, civic engagement and a more realized democracy will mean more than correcting distortions, misrepresentations and falsehoods produced by politicians, media talking heads and anti-public intellectuals. It will also require addressing how new sites of pedagogy have become central to any viable notion of agency, politics and democracy itself. This is not a matter of elevating cultural politics over material relations of power as much as it is a rethinking of how power deploys culture and how culture as a mode of education positions power. James Baldwin, the legendary African-American writer and civil rights activist, argued that the big lie points to a crisis of American identity and politics and is symptomatic of "a backward society" that has descended into madness, "especially when one is forced to lie about one's aspect of anybody's history, [because you then] must lie about it all."[(42)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a42) He goes on to argue "that one of the paradoxes of education [is] that precisely at the point when you begin to develop a conscience, you must find yourself at war with your society. It is your responsibility to change society if you think of yourself as an educated person."[(43)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a43) What Baldwin recognizes is that learning has the possibility to trigger a critical engagement with oneself, others and the larger society - education becomes in this instance more than a method or tool for domination but a politics, a fulcrum for democratic social change. Tragically, in our current climate "learning" merely contributes to a vast reserve of manipulation and self-inflicted ignorance. Our education deficit is neither reducible to the failure of particular types of teaching nor the decent into madness by the spokespersons for the new authoritarianism. Rather, it is about how matters of knowledge, values and ideology can be struggled over as issues of power and politics. Surviving the current education deficit will depend on progressives using history, memory and knowledge not only to reconnect intellectuals to the everyday needs of ordinary people, but also to jumpstart social movements by making education central to organized politics and the quest for a radical democracy.

the capitalist system results in massive structural violence that outweighs everything

**Abu-Jamal 98-**[Mumia, award winning Pennsylvania journalist, quotes James Gilligan, Professor at Harvard/NYU, “A quiet and deadly violence”, <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>]

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --GhandiIt has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging"structural' violence, of a kind thatdestroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function ofthe class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear warthat caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocideof the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on theweak andpoor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor. It is found in every country, submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their commonal lands (a precursor to similar struggles throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the 'Divine Right of Kings' to the spoils of class battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): They did not lose because landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests, streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless. (52) The "Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their interests, then, as now. It was a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that status was, or is. Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of harm to people should be allowed to remain, based solely upon its time in existence. Systems must serve life, or be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that theirgreat and terribleviolence passes away with them.

4. Alt comes first—doing nothing allows us to break with the status quo strategy of intervening without change, and instead risk the impossible

Daly 7-[Glyn, Lecturer of Politics at Northampton University, “The Materialism of Spirit: Zizek and the Logics of the Political,” International Journal of Zizek Studies, 1(4), 2007, http://www.zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/79/139, AD: 6-22-9]

In this sense our autonomy is at once more precarious and more radical. Today we are bombarded with all sorts of choices (consumption, lifestyles, customization of communication technologies etc.) that identify us as ‘free individuals’. Yet we also possess the capacity to refuse the field of choosing and freedom; to reject the very modality of making changes to our lives and to break with the terms and conditions that are implicit in the latter. Along the lines of the famous monologue from Trainspotting, we are in a position in which we can choose ‘not to choose life’. This involves the more radical ethical freedom of which Hegel speaks and of assuming a certain position of ‘being impossible’ – i.e. of refusing the terms of identitarian inscription. It is in this context that we can make sense of Žižek’s reference to the Melville character, Bartleby, and his ‘I would prefer not to’. Thus what is being is affirmed is a strategic form of non-intervention and a refusal to participate in whatŽižek calls the ‘rumspringaof resistance’: that is, ‘all the forms of resisting which help the system to reproduce itself by ensuring our participation in it’ (Žižek, 2006: 381-385). The problem is not so much direct participation in the system but rather the implicit forms of participation in the hegemonic practices and rituals that are expected of contemporary liberal-left resistance: it is thistype of resistance that needs to be resisted. So what needs to be developed is a kind of aggressive-passivity along the lines of ‘”I would prefer not to give to charity to support a Black orphan in Africa, engage in the struggle to prevent oil- drilling in a wildlife swamp, send books to educate our liberal-feminist-spirited women in Afghanistan”’ (Žižek, 2006: 383). And here I think that Stavrakakis misses his target when he criticises Žižek for arguing the case for inaction in the face of global-liberal-capitalism’s injunction that nothing should happen: ‘(s)urely “to do nothing” does not make sense as a remedy against those who supposedly argue that “nothing should happen”’ (Stavrakakis, 2007: 133). The ‘contradiction’ identified by Stavrakakis needs to read in terms of the discourse of the obsessive-neurotic who engages in all in kinds of frantic activity(filling up the gaps/silences) precisely in order that nothing Real should happen. So what we have is rather a paradoxwherein the possibility of genuine transformation is repressed through hyperactivity. Žižek’s point therefore is that ‘we’(i.e. the Left) should not participate in the terms of today’s dominant ethos of obsessive-neurosis and its hyperactive culture of political inaction.To avoid misunderstanding, the argument is not that we are obliged to choose between choosing and not-choosing or between capitulation and full scale assault on the existing mode of choosing. There is more ambiguity than may appear at first sight. A particular choice may be ‘officially’ permitted and yet implicitly prohibited (e.g. the declaration of atheism in American public life) and thus the making of that choice ‘within’ an existing modality may very well have the effect of undermining the modal logic. Equally, refusing to engage in making decisions or, what amounts to the same thing, making ‘impossible demands’ without any real substance can very quickly evoke a beautiful-soul-syndrome and an intrinsic passivity/inaction in the face of existing states of affairs. As Marx is reported to have said, insurrection is an art (cited in Trotsky, 1977). By this I take to mean that insurrection is a process of subversion that also undermines the existing logics of subversion as a way of forging new (utopic) spaces of political invention and creativity. It is in this context that Badiou’s idea of a politics of subtraction becomes important: i.e. a process of strategic withdrawal in such a way that it destroys not only the symbolic edifice but its very architectural logic as well. Of central importance is the attitude adopted towards the liberal democratic imagination. Radical democracy is something that strives to deepen and sharpen the latter (against capitalist and repressive logics etc.). But from this perspective the task of the Left cannot be to simply embrace this imagination as if it were a de facto end of history containing infinite potentiality. A Left politics of subtraction would mean above all standing with the symptomal truths of our age and recognising the way in which its multiculturalism and infra-political engagement are already implicated in, fractalized as part of, the totality of cosmopolitan capitalism and its deliquescence over such issues as global poverty and hunger.

**Single-issue movements will be co-opted by capitalism—only complete structural challenges have any hope.**

**Meszaros, 95** (Istivan, professor emeritus at the University of Sussex, *Beyond Capital*, pg. 39-40)

To aggravate the situation, everything is further complicated by the fact that it is not feasible to find partial solutions to the problems that must be faced. Thus, no ‘single issue’ can be realistically considered a ‘single issue.’ If nothing else, this circumstance has been forcefully highlighted by the disconcerting marginalization of the Green movement on the success of which so much hope has been placed in recent times, even among former socialists. In the past up to a few decades ago it was possible to squeeze out of capital what appeared to be significant concessions—such as relative gains for the socialist movement (which later turned out to be reversible both as legislative measures for working class action and as gradually improving standard of living), obtained through the defensive organizations of labour: its trades unions and parliamentary parties. These gains could be conceded by capital so long as they could be assimilated and integrated by the system as a whole and turned to its productive advantage in the course of its self-expansion. Today, by contrast, confronting even partial issues with any hope of success implies the necessity of challenging the capital system as such. For in our own historical epoch, when productive self-expansion is no longer a readily available way out of the accumulating difficulties and contradictions (hence the purely wishful thinking of getting rid of the black hope of indebtedness by ‘growing out of it’), the global capital system of necessity frustrates all attempts at interfering even to a minimal extent with its structural parameters. In this respect the obstacles to be overcome are actually shared by labour—that is, labour as the radical alternative to capital’s social metabolic order—and the ‘single issue’ movements. For the historic failure of social democracy clearly underlined that only integrable demands can gain legitimacy under the rule of capital. Environmentalism by its very nature—just like the great historic cause of women’s liberation—is non-integrable. Consequently no such cause will for the capital system conveniently fade way, irrespective of how many setbacks and defeats the politically organized forms of ‘single issue’ movements might have to suffer in the foreseeable future. However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naïve. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable issue, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but—precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital—can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

**The greatest happiness for the greatest number is structurally impossible under capitalism- utilitarianism means you should vote neg**

**Meszaros 95** (Istvan, Prof Emeritus of Philosophy @ U of Sussex, “Beyond Capital” 3.2, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/meszaros/works/beyond-capital/ch03-2.htm> JF)

A great deal has been written about the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ concerning ‘pleasure’ and the ‘desirable’ in utilitarian discourse. However, the real fallacy of utilitarian philosophy – fully embraced in one form or another by the representatives of marginal utility theory – is to talk about ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ in capitalist society. For the suggestion that anything even remotely approaching the greatest happiness of the greatest number of human beings can be achieved under the rule of capital, without even examining let alone radically changing the established power relations, constitutes a monumental vacuous assumption, whatever the subjective intentions of the major utilitarian philosophers behind it. Marginal utility theory, instead of acting in this respect as a corrective to Bentham and Mill, makes everything worse by asserting not only that it is possible to maximise every individual’s utility within the established framework of production and distribution, but also that the desired maximisation is actually being accomplished in the ‘normal’ processes of self-equilibrating capitalist economy. People who deny the reality of such a happy state of affairs are dismissed even by the enlightened paternalist Alfred Marshall by saying that ‘they nearly always divert energies from sober work for the public good, and are thus mischievous in the long run’. In this way even the indirect acknowledgment of capital’s uncontrollability does not last very long. Admitting that the controlling power of the businessman/entrepreneur cannot account for the functioning of the system, let alone guarantee the satisfaction of the wants generated under capitalism, does not lead to a badly needed critical examination. On the contrary, the broadest possible extension of the notion of the controlling subject (done in such a way that it fictitiously embraces the totality of individuals) – which is another way of saying that no identifiable subject is really in control, other than what Hegel characterised with the notion of ‘bad infinity’ – is used for the most apologetic purpose. For with the help of this extension and individualistic harmonisation of all ‘legitimate’ claims the actually existing class subjects of the system capital and labour – are fictitiously ‘transcended’ towards ‘bad infinity’, thereby simply assuming out of existence the problems and antagonistic contradictions of the established socioeconomic order. The mathematical and ‘scientific’ garb in which this conceptual framework of assuming out of existence the dilemmas of control is dressed up well serves the purpose of removing the temptation of contesting the various tenets of the ‘subjective revolution’ and ‘marginalist revolution’ in other than the purely self-referential ‘rational’ terms of the theory, far away from actual substantive social – not to say class – issues.

## 1NR

#### The aff’s framework is the conservative movement that Rorty warned you about. Their call for universal standards ignore oppression. Incorporating queer theory into education reverses this negative trend, resolves social justice issues, and avoids their offense.

**Kumashiro 4** (Kevin, professor of Asian American Studies and Education at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 3/10/04, “Queer Ideals in Education”, Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline, p. 366-7, MH)

**There is something significant, then, about the “queer” in education. There is something significantly disruptive about those educational practices that some in society want to silence. This is where I find much value in queer theory. I find that queer theory has much to offer those of us working to change the fields of educational research and practice in our movements toward social justice**. It is not without tension that I draw on queer theory, especially as an activist committed to challenging multiple forms of oppression in schools and society. A number of activists and academics have suggested that the term “queer,” when used as a term of self-empowerment, does not apply to some people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexed, such as those who are also of color. They tell us that the politics surrounding queer identities and movements may be working to trouble the normalcy of certain social markers like gender and sexual orientation, but are simultaneously reinforcing the marginalization of other markers like race. The result is that groups traditionally privileged in mainstream society remain privileged even in marginalized and activist communities, as with White Americans in queer movements. Queer politics is too often colored by Eurocentrism. This should not be surprising– eurocentrism (as with other “isms”) is often the norm in countless aspects of our lives, and its everydayness or commonsense nature makes it difficult to be recognized, much less challenged, no matter what the context. **Challenging the multiple oppressions in our lives requires challenging the many norms that privilege and marginalize different groups or simply different ways of being.** Even queer movements have internal work to do, and perhaps always will. After all**, queer politics are all about disrupting what has become “normal.” Queer politics do not only celebrate difference,** as when asserting that, Yes, we are queer and are not what society says is normal. **Queer politics also critique the standards that define certain things as “different”** in the first place, as when asserting that, No, we do not even want to be “normal” because society’s definition of normal is a pretty oppressive way to be. And this does not only apply to sex and sexuality. **The bases for critiquing what is normal (everyday) and normative (required) may have arisen in response to the ways that “alternative” sexual orientations and gender expressions get called “queer,” but there do exist many forms of oppression that define certain things as the norm and all other things as queer**. In fact, **queer politics are premised on the notion that norms of society require the existence of things queer**. Some things cannot be normal if other things are not already abnormal. Queerness is not a natural state of being. Rather, **queerness is produced as a contrast, as that against which normalcy is established. This production of queerness is always happening**. Even our work within queer politics–from our theorizing to our street activism–cannot help but normalize only certain identities or ideas or practices while defining all others as too queer. Little effort is required to find instances of things that seem too queer even for queer politics, as when “we” do not want to address certain sexual practices or racialized bodies or other differences because they will “detract” from our goals. **Queer movements can marginalize certain ways of being (too) queer even while challenging the marginalization of other ways of being (acceptably) queer. Our work, then, is quite paradoxical: it constitutes movements that both challenge and contribute to different forms of oppression. It requires constantly problematizing the ways that we may unintentionally normalize only certain ways of being queer. It prevents us from thinking that our identities or our work or our end products are ever fully “queer,” and instead insists that we see queerness as ideals that never solidify because, once grasped, they tend towards normalcy. As I bring these insights to bear on the troubling movements in U.S. schools, I am reminded of the importance of embracing the paradoxical nature of challenging oppression**. As teachers and learners, **we need to examine how all approaches to teaching and learning are partial, including those approaches that center on social justice. We need to examine how the things we learn can be useful for improving our lives as well as how they can contribute to oppression in often invisible ways. And we need to examine both the normalizing and the queering of what and how we teach, and why this might be the case. I feel discomforted by the notion that queer movements in education should never end, and yet, such a realization is exactly what gives me hope for a future less colored by oppression.**

#### Representations must precede policy discussion – they inform all of our policy choices and justifications.

Neta Crawford 2 ,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

Analyzing of sexual discourse is crucial to delegitimating heterosexist authority.

Halperin 95 David M. Halperin, American theorist in the fields of gender studies, queer theory, critical theory, material culture and visual culture, "Sain Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, " New York Oxford University Press, pg. 30-31, 1995

There are doubtless many other factors that may explain the over determined appeal for gay activists of Foucault in general and The History of Sexuality, Volume I, in particular. For the purpose of this essay, however, I want to concentrate on only one motive for the gay-militant appropriation of Foucault. I believe that Foucault's political approach to discourse, specifically his inquiry into what might be called the political economy of sexual discourse, 34 enables us to devise some effective strategies for confronting and resisting the discursive operations of contemporary homophobia. For one thing, Foucault's example teaches us to analyze discourse strategically, not in terms of what it says but in terms of what it does and how it works. That does not mean that we learn from Foucault to treat the content of particular discourses as uninteresting or irrelevant (after all, one has to understand what discourses say in order to be able to analyze what they do and how they work); it does mean that we learn from him not to allow the truth or falsity of particular propositions to distract us from the power-effects they produce or the manner in which they are deployed within particular systems of discursive and institutional practice. 35 The effect of Foucault's political approach to discourse is not to collapse truth into power but to shift the focus of our attention from matters of truth to matters of power. 36 That shift has proven extremely profitable for the analysis of homophobic discourse; 37 it has also proven crucial for the larger projects of delegitimating heterosexist authority and empowering gay practices of knowledge and community. I shall take up each of these three points in turn.

#### A critique and change of our language is essential to performing agency. Using different language and description is itself resistance.

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Language penetrates all aspects of transversal struggles. Whatever we think and do is framed by the language within which these acts are carried out. Hence, an engagement with the philosophy of language must be part of an adequate approach to questions of agency in global politics, especially if this approach rests upon a view of human life as constituted by self-understanding. [40](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471107#40) From such a vantage point language must be seen not as an image of the world or a way of representing realities, but, as Wittgenstein's famous dictum holds, as 'part of an activity, a way of life'. [41](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471107#41) This position has farreaching consequences. If language expresses a particular way of life it is also responsible, at least in part, for the constitution of this way of life. Human agency cannot take place outside language, in some pre- or extra-linguistic realm. It can only take place through language. Expressed differently: languages are not just frameworks to assess actions. They are themselves forms of action. There are, of course, countless domains in which language interferes with transversal struggles. We live at a time when ever-increasing communicative capabilities account for an ever-shrinking globe. Moreover, transversal politics revolves not only around interactions between various national languages, but also between different types of speech. When a liberal, a realist, a defence technician or a peace movement member describes the same event, they use very different languages to interpret the realities they see. Each of these languages has its own set of rules. Each embodies a world-view that implicitly promotes certain social values and certain political, ethical and spatial perceptions of global politics. The clash between these forms of speech is the domain where domination and resistance is carried out. It is the process that engenders human agency.

#### Our kritik is a pre-requisite to understanding the affirmative’s scenario planning. Epistemology is the lynchpin of policymaking.

Mercer 05 (Jonathan, Prof of Poli Sci at University of Washington, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics”, International Organization, Volume 59, Issue 1, pp. 77-106, Jstor,)

Behaviorists thought they eliminated the mind from their explanations, for they focused on what they imagined to be law-like relationships between stimulus and effect. Animals respond to incentives, such as corn pellets or cash rewards, and this allows analysts to explain and predict behavior without reference to mental processes. However, as Chomsky observed, analysts cannot identify a stimulus without first identifying a response, in which case a stimulus is not a property of the environment but of the individual's beliefs and desires. This observation makes clear, as Chomsky notes, "that the talk of 'stimulus control' simply disguises a complete retreat to mentalistic psychology." 30 Rather than help analysts escape from psychology, stimulus-and-response approaches depend on understanding an actor's mental state. Even if researchers control the environment and provide only one stimulus, how subjects respond to that stimulus depends not on its physical attributes but on the subjective understanding (or construal) of the stimulus.31 Researchers can reliably predict that a food-deprived chicken will respond to a lever that gives it food, or that a person will respond to a $10 bill on the ground by picking it up, but prediction becomes unreliable in slightly more complex settings. How students respond to very low (but passing) grades differs dramatically: some students work harder, some blame the exam, and some pump their fist and say "Yes!" Despite behaviorists' attempts to rely only on behavior, they nonetheless relied on folk psychology. Behaviorists eliminated from their explanations neither desires (I want that corn pellet) nor beliefs (at the end of the third maze on the left is food). Without knowing desires and beliefs, one cannot know what "works" as an incentive.

#### Heteronormative IR kills international cooperation – only queering solves the integration of perspectives.

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**By framing war in terms of gender both pro-war and anti-war continuously re-assert old and easily understood cultural meanings of gender**. While anti-war actors agree that **war debate is about masculinity,** they must actively contest the masculinity mobilized by pro-war actors to make the case for war. Anti-war actors contest the cowboy masculinity valued by those who are pro-war in favor a masculinity that values diplomacy and international relationships. According to anti-war actors, cowboy masculinity and its simplistic language and “go it alone” approach to foreign policy has serious consequences as it devalues discussion and dissent. Anti-war actors value a kind of masculinity that is about forming relationships through diplomacy instead of rushing into war as unilateral action. **There are serious consequences for using lone ranger cowboy masculinity to frame war debat**e. When the pro-war position values a “lone ranger,” “go it alone” kind of cowboy masculinity **they** are **actively devalue diplomacy, and debate, at the cost of international relationships and international organizations**. Mobilizing cowboy masculinity **thus has consequences for international peace and diplomacy as cowboy devalues complex discussion, international cooperation, and organizations such as the United Nations**. Pro-war actors are primarily responsible for framing war debate around macho, cowboy masculinity in order to construct the case for war. Anti-war actors only work within the frame of masculinity given by pro-war actors when they contest the pro-war argument. As a result, anti- war actors rarely engage in active framing of war, and thus do not have the opportunity to construct a complex anti-war argument. **By continuing to construct war debate war within the constraining frame of gender, anti-war actors not challenge the dismissal of “feminine” perspectives from war debate as voices that are not the correct kind of masculinity (such as the perspective of women) are silenced.** Framing **war debate** in terms of better or worse forms of masculinity **simplifies debate,** as those who are anti-war are only able to construct opposing perspectives that require different conceptions of masculinity instead of transgressing gender altogether. Furthermore, constructing international actors and states as male individuals justifies organizing war debate around conceptions of masculinity as male international actors must express a specific kind of masculinity or feel threatened otherwise.